

## Message Text

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21/16

ACTION EA-10

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R 080445Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

TO AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9444

USIA WASHDC

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC

UNCLAS WELLINGTON 0924

(CORRECTED COPY FOR ADDRESSEE ONLY)

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EO 11652: NA

TAGS: PFOR SN

SUBJECT: TEXT OF LEE KUAN YEW SPEECH

REF WELLINGTON 0918

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH DELIVERED BY  
SINGAPORE PRIME MINISTER LEE KUAN YEW TO NEW ZEALAND  
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, APRIL 7, 1975.

2. BEGIN QUOTE: I AM NOT GOING TO TALK ABOUT DOMINOES.

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I HAVE BEVER PLAYED THE GAME. NOR DO I THINK IT AN

APPROPRIATE FIGURE OF SPEECH FOR THE TRAGEDY WE ARE WITNESSING IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA. WHAT IS HAPPENING THERE IS HAVING A PROFOUND EFFECT ON THE MINDS OF OTHERS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, PARTICULARLY CAMBODIA'S IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOUR, THE THAI'S. THE NIXON DOCTRINE, ANNOUNCED IN GUAM IN 1969, THAT AMERICA WILL MATERIALLY HELP THOSE WHO ARE READY TO HELP THEMSELVES, DIED WITH WATERGATE. EVERYONE KNEW THAT NO AMERICAN SOLDIER WOULD EVER FIGHT A GUERILLA IN ASIA AFTER THE PARIS AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 1973 ALLOWED THEM TO DISENGAGE WITH HONOUR. BY AUGUST 1973, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS HAD INTERDICTED THEIR PRESIDENT FROM USING AMERICAN BOMBERS WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

3. NIXON RESIGNED IN AUGUST 1974. THERE HAS BEEN NO TIME TO SPELL OUT A FORD DOCTRINE. BUT HE DID TRY TO DEFINE HIS AID POLICY ON SOUTH VIETNAM, NAMELY THREE MORE YEARS OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID BEFORE A FINAL CUTOFF. WE KNEW THAT THE AMERICAN CONGRESS DID NOT AGREE WITH THEIR PRESIDENT.

4. THE NEW THAI PRIME MINISTER HAS NOW PUBLICALLY ASKED AMERICAN FORCES TO LEAVE WITHIN A YEAR. SINCE AMERICAN FORCES CANNOT HELP THEM ON LAND OR IN THE AIR, THE THAIS MIGHT AS WELL MAKE A VIRTUE OF REQUESTING AN AMERICAN MILITARY WITHDRAWAL. FROM A SYMBOL OF POWER AND SECURITY, THEY HAVE BECOME OBSTACLES TO A CHANGE IN POSTURE, WHICH MUST PRECEDE A CHANGE OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE OTHER GREAT POWERS. I DOUBT IF ANY THAI GOVERNMENT, CIVILIAN OR MILITARY, WILL WANT TO BE ENGAGED IN THE KIND OF GUERILLA INSURGENCY THAT HAS CRUSHED CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM. RATHER THAN GO THROUGH THIS MINCING MACHINE, IT MAKES MORE SENSE TO SEEK POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SOULUTOONS. ADJUSTMENT AND ACCOMMODATION TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NECESSARY. THAIS AND OTHERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA KNOW THAT THE PATIENCE AND PERSERVANCE OF AMERICANS HAVE NOT MATCHED THAT OF THE COMMUNISTS, NOT SIMPLY COMMUNISTS IN VIETNAM, BUT ALSO THEIR SUPPLIERS, THE PRC AND THE SOVIET UNION. SINCE THE THAIS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO MAKE AMENDS TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FOR THE DAMAGE WHICH THE AMERICAN B-52S, USING AIR BASES IN THAILAND, HAVE CAUSE, IT WILL BE EASIER FOR  
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THEM TO BEFRIEND THE PRC THAN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. AFTER ALL, THAILAND DID NO HARM TO CHINA. IN ANY CASE, THE PRC HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES TO BE MORE RELIABLE FRIENDS, TO JUDGE FROM THEIR SUPPORT OF WHAT ONCE LOOKED THE HOPELESS CAUSE OF PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE KHMER ROUGE.

5. THE REST OF SOUTHEAST ASIA WILL HAVE TO LIVE WITH WHAT-  
EVER POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION THE THAIS MAKE. FORTUNATELY,

THAILAND HAS AMPLE TIME TO WORK OUT WHAT IS IN HER BEST INTERESTS. FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL TAKE MANY YEARS TO MEND A WAR-SHATTERED VIETNAM BEFORE UNDERTAKING FURTHER ADVENTURE IN HELPING THAI INSURGENTS. AND THE KHMER ROUGE OR GRUNK, THE ACRONYM FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT, WILL BE BUSY NOT ONLY REPAIRING THE SHATTERED ECONOMY OF CAMBODIA AND HER DISPLACED PEOPLE, BUT ALSO PREVENTING THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS FROM BECOMING THE DOMINANT INFLUENCE OVER THEIR COUNTRY. IN FACT, PRINCE SIHANOUK TOOK ELABORATE PAINS TO STATE THAT CAMBODIA'S NUMBER ONE FRIEND WILL ALWAYS BE THE PRC. IF KHIEU SAMPHAN AND OTHER KHMER ROUGE LEADERS SHARE THIS VIEW, THEN HANOI'S CAPACITY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING INSURGENCY MAY NOT REACH THAILAND OTHER THAN THROUGH LAOS TO THE NORTHEAST OF THAILAND.

6. THAILAND'S SOUTHERN NEIGHBOR, PENINSULAR MALAYSIA, HAS A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT SITUATION. MALAYSIA'S GUERRILLA MOVEMENT HAS ALWAYS BEEN, AND STILL IS, LED BY ETHNIC CHINESE. FOR A COMMUNIST INSURGENCY TO SUCCEED, THE REBELS MUST THROW UP MALAY LEADERS TO HAVE A BETTER ETHNIC BALANCE IN THE LEADERSHIP. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN THEY GET MORE REPRESENTATIVE SUPPORT FROM THE GROUND. WHILST THIS IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE, IT WILL TAKE A VERY LONG TIME, IF IT CAN BE DONE AT ALL.

7. AN ERA HAS COME TO AN END. AMERICA WAS THE DOMINANT POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA FOR THIRTY YEARS SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II. ONCE AMERICA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SHE COULD NO LONGER INTERVENE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, IT IS FAIR TO ASSUME THAT THE CONTEST FOR INFLUENCE OVER THE PEOPLES IN THE REGION WILL BE MAINLY BETWEEN THE PC AND THE SOVIET UNION, BOTH OF WHOM OPENLY AVOW THEIR DUTY TO HELP COMMUNISTS EVERYWHERE AND TO PROMOTE REVOLUTION. THE FEAT OF

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SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES IS TO BE CAUGHT IN A COMPETITIVE CLASH BETWEEN THESE TWO. CHINA HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF HISTORIC ASSOCIATIONS WITH THE REGION. MEMORIES OF PAST TRIBUTES PAID AND AN AWARENESS OF GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY MAKE ALL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ANXIOUS NOT TO TAKE SIDES WITH THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST THE PRC EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIET UNION IS AHEAD ON MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. MOST HOPE TO MAINTAIN EQUABLE RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE PRC AND THE SOVIET UNION. BUT THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE UNLESS THESE TWO COMMUNIST CENTERS CEASE TO COMPETE FOR IDEOLOGICAL AND NATIONALIST SUPREMACY-A PROSPECT WHICH APPEARS REMOTE. MEANWHILE, A CONTINUING AMERICAN NAVAL PRESENCE AND INCREASED ECONOMIC RELATIONS WILL HELP THE REST OF SOUTHEAST ASIA TO ADJUST LESS ABRUPTLY AND TO MAKE THE TASK OF LEARNING TO LIVE WITH A COMMUNIST INDOCHINA

LESS PAINFUL. END QUOTE.  
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## Message Attributes

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